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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURES-SANCTIONS AVAILABLE
To ENFORCE PRE-TRIAL ORDERS-Petitioner, plaintiff in an action in federal
district court, was ordered under Federal Rule 161 to submit pre-trial statements setting out the facts of the case, his damages, his witnesses and
exhibits, and his legal theories of recovery. His counsel filed statements
which were adjudged insufficient, and a pre-trial order was entered precluding petitioner from offering at trial any testimony by witnesses other than
himself and his wife, or any evidence concerning liability in negligence
or breach of warranty, and limiting his exhibits and evidence of damages.
On petition for mandamus to set aside the preclusion order, held, granted,
one judge dissenting in part. Since Rule 16 authorizes the issuance of an
order setting forth only those points on which the parties have willingly
reached agreement, the information requested could not be compelled,
and the preclusion order exceeded the judge's authority. 2 Padovani v.
Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961).

1 "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference to consider (1) The simplification of the issues;
• • • (3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses; . • •
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
"The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as
to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice.'' Fm. R. Crv. P. 16.
2 The court also held that the directions issued by the pre-trial judge were too in-
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Of the several devices which may be used to gather information between
the pleading and trial stages in the federal courts, the pre-trial conference
has gained perhaps the widest recognition3 and is regularly used, particularly in protracted litigation.4 The purpose and function of the pre-trial
hearing is to define and simplify the issues between the parties and to
ascertain the facts which relate to these issues, in this way lessening the
chance of surprise at the trial and the risk of judicial error.11 However,
since neither this often-stated purpose nor rule 16 itself provides the pretrial judge with an adequate outline of his powers and duties the rule is
sometimes misused6 in an attempt to clear up backlogs of docketed cases,
or is used with less than its full effectiveness. The problem is to define,
without over-restricting the judge's discretion, what information may be
required of the parties, and what sanctions are available to insure compliance.7
Some courts and writers advocate limiting the amount of information
required from the parties at pre-trial to little more than a statement of
the relevant facts. 8 There is a fear among adherents of this policy that
because trials seldom go as counsel expect,9 any more extensive requirement
would be likely to abridge the rights of the parties at trial.10 They insist
definite, and in this the dissenting judge concurred. The dissent found fault with alleged
indications in the majority decision that a court may not issue a preclusion order upon
failure of a party to comply with directions, and that the facts in issue and legal theories relied upon may not be ascertained prior to trial.
See, e.g., 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 16.06 (2d ed. 1948) •
For an indication of the problems peculiar to protracted litigation and suggested
pre-trial procedures for this class of cases, see ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 25 (1955) (proposed amendment to rule
16) ; McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV.
L. REv. 27 (1950); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1959);
Report: Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953).
5 Cherney v. Holmes, 185 F.2d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1950) ; American Oil Co. v.
Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 682 (D.Rl. 1959) ; Laws, Plan for
Pre-Trial Procedure Under New Rules in District of Columbia, 25 A.B.A.J. 855 (1939);
Success of Pretrial Hearing Demonstrated, 21 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 160 (1938).
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (6), supra note 1, is sometimes taken as a license to force a settlement.
7 Contrary to the indication of the court in the principal case, the pre-trial judge
has the power to compel certain admissions from the parties. The use of rule 16 is
discretionary, but to say that a court, having decided upon pre-trial proceedings, cannot
compel the parties to follow the directives of a pre-trial judge would render the rule
nugatory. The courts' complete acceptance of the power of the pre-trial judge to invoke
sanctions for failure to follow directives is based on the premise that the judge may
compel the parties to participate in the proceedings.
8 See, e.g., Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1957) •
9 See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 87 (1949).
10 See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 1473, 1481 (1958). There has been some concern that, because of the finality
ac_cord~d pre-tri~ ord~~s, facts o_r legal theories w_hlch take on importance only after pretnal will be denied ainng at tnal. But courts will generally amend orders prior to trial
3
4
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that pre-trial is merely a form of pleading and that, therefore, only the
facts of the case should be considered-the responsibility being upon the
trial court alone to determine relevant legal theories.11 This distrust of
pre-trial proceedings has led a majority of courts to hold also that a party
is not required to disclose his witnesses prior to trial lest he be damaged
by his failure to anticipate witnesses he may want to call.12 If the pretrial is actually to expedite the trial of the case, however, mere statements
of agreed facts seem inadequate to meet this objective, and other courts
uphold the requirement of a full and complete disclosure of all legal and
fact issues which the parties intend to raise at trial,13 with the exception
of issues which may involve privileged or impeaching matter.14 Some
courts, moreover, require the parties to list the names and addresses of
their prospective witnesses. This would seem to be the better rule,115 since
it would tend to narrow the areas of inquiry and argument with regard to
those witnesses at trial. This would not only shorten trial time, but would
increase the likelihood of a just outcome by reducing trial by battle of
counsel, a major objective of the Federal Rules.16
if motion is made to enter evidence not known at the time of pre-trial conference, and
issues not indicated at pre-trial may even be entered at trial if necessary to prevent "manifest injustice." See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 599 (1952) •
11 The majority opinion in the principal case apparently takes this restricted view
of pre-trial.
12 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 11 26.19, at 1077-81 (2d ed. 1950) •
18 However, it has been stated that if a pre-trial is to make a determination of all
relevant issues without impinging on the rights of the parties at trial, these issues should
be considered one by one, with the judge exploring both sides of each issue, determining
both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's response before moving on. Quite often at
pre-trial the defendant will attempt to postpone any disclosure of his own position
until all of the details of the plaintiff's case have been revealed. This is not "limiting the
issues," but actually approaches trial procedure, where the plaintiff must state a case be•
fore the defendant goes forward, and, as stated in the principal case, almost inevitably
leads to some "sacrifice of the court's natural position of strict neutrality among litigants." McDowell, Pretrial Procedures; Pretrial v. Procedure, 4 ANTITRUsr Buu.. 675,
681 (1959).
In order that pre-trial actually assist the trial on the merits, results must be reached
as quickly as possible. Yet in the principal case, proceedings preparatory to the conference itself, in which plaintiff was required to submit lengthy written statements, took
well over a year. Submission of memoranda by the parties prior to pre-trial conference
has been found to be of great value, but when it becomes evident that such ancillary requests are hindering rather than speeding the conference, the judge should abandon the
inquiry or, in the case of an uncooperative counsel, invoke appropriate sanctions.
14 Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1956); Bogatay
v. Montour R.R., 177 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 17 F.R.D. 52, 55 (D. Ore. 1954); Burton v. Weyerhaeuser
Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 572 (D. Ore. 1941) ; 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, 1J 16.08.
115 See 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 12, 11 26.19. Some provision should be made, however, to allow testimony by a bona fide after-acquired witness.
16 See, e.g., In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1942) · and Laws Pre-Trial
-Its P_urposes and J?otentiali~ies, 21 ?Eo. WASH. L. REv. I, 5 (1952), in which is argued
that without pre-trial there IS surpnse and confusion at trial, giving a great advantage

it
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In order that the pre-trial conference be effective, the judge must have
some means of enforcing his orders. There are three sanctions commonly
used: the judge may enter a dismissal with prejudice which bars the
offending party from the trial court and allows him only an appeal; he
may preclude a party from offering specified evidence or legal theories at
trial; 17 or he may fine the offender. There has been uniform acceptance
of the district courts' power to use the first two sanctions, but there is
marked divergence as to the scope of their application. There are indications that the circuits which have limited the information required of the
parties will also keep a tight rein on the discretion exercised by the pretrial judge, approving a preclusion order only when absolutely necessary
to a just and efficient disposition of the case, and allowing a dismissal
only when a party has shown an extraordinary disregard for the judge's
authority.18 On the other hand, other circuits have been quite liberal in
allowing the district courts to dismiss complaints and issue preclusion orders
when pre-trial directives are not followed. 19 No court, however, has as yet
defined limits to guide the pre-trial judge in his determination of whether
to issue a preclusion order or whether to enter a dismissal. The third
sanction, the imposition of a fine, has been approved by some courts20 and
legal writers,21 but has not often been used by pre-trial judges. Since the
judge may fine either the party or counsel, this sanction has the obvious
advantage of penalizing the disobedient party without detracting from
his case at trial. It would seem that such a sanction should have been
used in the principal case, and indeed, since so often counsel is at fault
rather than the litigant himself, imposition of a fine would be effective and
proper in most instances of non-compliance with pre-trial directions and
would further achieve the Federal Rules' goal of shielding clients from
the consequences of counsel's delinquencies.
Allowing the pre-trial judge to demand a wide variety of information
from the parties, with drastic sanctions available in case of non-compliance,
is admittedly a grant of power which, if misused as in the principal case,
to the party with the more proficient counsel, which should not exist in an "enlightened
system of justice."
17 This sanction, when carried to an extreme as in the principal case, may be just
as destructive of the party's case as outright dismissal by allowing him to go to trial
with such a paucity of admissible evidence that he has no possibility of obtaining judgment.
18 See, e.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir.
1959).
19 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, upheld a dismissal entered when plaintiff's
counsel failed to appear at a pre-trial hearing. Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542 (7th
Cir. 1961).
20 See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 763, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1961) •
21 See, e.g., LAws & STOCKMAN, PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES 11 Gudicial .Administration
Monographs, Series A, No. 4, 1941) .
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can prejudice a party's case. Nevertheless, something more than the power
to require the "unforced" statement of facts recommended in the principal
case22 can be given without impairing the trial on the merits. A set of
flexible rules should be formulated, perhaps by the Supreme Court in its
supervisory capacity, which would both define the judge's duty and set
a limit on his power under rule 16.23 The judge should probably be required in all cases to have the parties submit a statement of the facts to
be relied upon at trial, and a list of prospective witnesses and exhibits.
As a general limitation, the attorney work-product theory24 and foreseeability problems probably dictate that the judge should not be granted the
power to require the parties to indicate which witnesses and exhibits are
intended to establish particular facts, or the way in which established facts
are intended to support particular legal theories. However, he should have
a good deal of freedom to request intermediate information. Although the
taking of actual testimony should be left to the trial court, the pre-trial
judge might request the parties to indicate the general nature of the evidence to be given by the witnesses listed. The listing would allow the
adverse party to take depositions and inquire into the qualifications of
expert witnesses; the indication of their connection with the case would
be of value when a large number of witnesses was anticipated, and could
be of use to the judge in limiting the number of expert witnesses.25
Similarly, requiring the parties to list exhibits would further insure that
each party will be forewarned as to what his adversary will proffer, and
should the judge feel that furnishing copies at pre-trial would expedite the
subsequent trial, he could request their submission, provided the request
is reasonable.26 Such a request would be particularly appropriate in protracted litigation where there is usually a large amount of documentary
material which could be condensed, made a part of the pre-trial order, and
read directly into the trial record. In order to prevent a return to "code
pleading," probably the judge should have no power to require the parties
to list their legal theories. In the few cases in which it is not obvious that
there is a legal theory to support a party's claim or defense, opposing
counsel can force a declaration of the relevant theory by moving for summary judgment.
There should also be guide lines to aid the judge in his selection of
sanctions. The general requirement should be that the judge determine
Principal case at 550.
See also Christenson, When Is a Pre-Trial Conference a "Pre-Trial Conference"?,
23 F.R.D. 129 (1959) listing thirteen points which the author believes are "minimum
components" of an effective pre-trial conference.
24 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (4).
26 See Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 295 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1961), reversing a pre-trial order for the production of an unreasonable number of exhibits.
22
23
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whether counsel or the party himself is at fault, perhaps presuming that
when the failure concerns the facts of the case the fault lies with the
party, and that a delinquency in listing legal theories, if required, is attributable to counsel. Dismissal or preclusion should be ordered only when the
fault lies with the party, and probably the dismissal order should be
reserved for failures to list facts sufficient to support the claim. Obviously
these restrictions on pre-trial orders and sanctions will deprive the pre-trial
judge of some of his discretion. Nevertheless, setting up a framework of
powers and duties within which the pre-trial judge should function would
help to ensure more speedy, just and efficient disposition of civil suits in
the federal courts.

John M. Price

